This article has a deprecated, subst'ed or incorrect infobox and needs a new one. Please consult the relevant WikiProject or this category to find the appropriate replacement.

The Åsta accident was a railway accident that occurred at 13:12:25 on 4 January 2000 at Åsta in Åmot, south of Rena in Østerdalen, Norway. A train from Trondheim collided with a local train from Hamar on Rørosbanen resulting in an explosive fire. 19 people were killed while 67 survived the accident.

Account of the accident

Memorial stone with the names of the 19 people who died in the accident

Train 2301, a train hauled by a Di 3-class diesel locomotive,^[1] departed on schedule from Trondheim Central Station at 07:45 in the morning on Tuesday 4 January 2000 with 75 people on board. Its final destination was Hamar Station. Because connecting trains were running late, the train departure from Røros Station was 21 minutes late. The schedule delay was partially recovered, and by arrival and departure at Rena Station the train was running only 7 minutes late. At departure the signal showed green, and the log at the traffic control center at Hamar after the accident showed that the south-bound signal on the main line was also green.

Train 2369, a BM92 diesel multiple unit,^[1] left Hamar Station on schedule at 12:30 with 10 passengers onboard. The train was headed for Rena Station, after which it was to return to Hamar. At Rustad Station the train stopped to pick up one passenger at 13:06 and, according to the schedule, the train was supposed to have remain at Rustad until 13:10 to wait for the train from north. When the train left Rustad at 13:07 with 11 persons on board, including the engineer and conductor, the log shows that the signal did not show green. The log also revealed that the rail switch at the exit had been forced open by the northbound train.

Traffic control on the Rørosbanen line between Hamar and Røros is controlled by the Train Control Center at Hamar. The dispatcher there was also responsible for watching the more heavily trafficked stretch south from Hamar to Eidsvoll. There was no audible alarm installed to warn when two trains are on collision course on this stretch, and although a message in red print may have been visible on the screen warning that an accident was imminent, the traffic controller did not observe this visual warning until 13:11:30.

At the time of the accident neither an Automatic Train Control (ATC, a system for automatically stopping trains) nor a train radio was installed on trains on the Rørosbanen line. The only way to contact the trains was via mobile telephones. The mobile telephone numbers for the engineers and conductors on the trains had either been recorded on the wrong list, or had not been listed. Hence, by the time the traffic controller in Hamar recognized the problem he was unable to determine where to phone.

At 13:12:35 the trains collided.

Aftermath

On 1 September 1997 Jernbaneverket and Norges Statsbaner introduced new departure routines for passenger trains where only the engineer, and not both the engineer and conductor as before, where required to check that the main departure signal from a station showed go before the train started from a station. This was despite that the Norwegian Railway Inspectorate didn't accept that the new departure procedures were to be introduced on Rørosbanen, among other things because of the special conditions there. The Rail Inspectorate protested, also to the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications, and got support there, without this changing the actual departure procedures.

External links

• Report from the accident commission, 4 January 2000 (Norwegian (Bokmål))
• Unnskyld at jeg lever (ISBN 9788291352442) - Book by victim on survivor's guilt following accident (Norwegian (Bokmål)).

References

1. ^ ^{a b} "Åsta-rapporten mottatt med sterke følelser". Aftenposten. 11 November 2000. http://tux1.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/d172787.htm. Retrieved on 2007-02-27.